{"id":5822,"date":"2026-11-16T13:32:10","date_gmt":"2026-11-16T16:32:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/?p=5822"},"modified":"2026-11-16T13:32:10","modified_gmt":"2026-11-16T16:32:10","slug":"prompt-injection-and-ai-agent-security-what-the-cto-should-require-before-going-to-production","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/en\/prompt-injection-and-ai-agent-security-what-the-cto-should-require-before-going-to-production\/","title":{"rendered":"Prompt Injection and AI Agent Security: What the CTO Should Require Before Going to Production"},"content":{"rendered":"<p dir=\"ltr\">Prompt injection is an attack in which malicious instructions enter the content an AI agent reads, and the agent follows them as if they were legitimate. There is no definitive fix for this problem. That is why a CTO\u2019s requirement before putting an agent into production should not be \u201cblock the attack,\u201d but rather \u201climit what the agent can do once it has been fooled.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">This matters most when an agent stops merely chatting and starts acting. In <a href=\"https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/en\/ai-agents-for-business-6-use-cases-with-roi-and-how-to-move-beyond-the-pilot\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cAI agents for business: 6 use cases with ROI and how to move beyond the pilot\u201d<\/a>, the value comes precisely from reading emails, querying ERP and CRM systems, and carrying out tasks. That same capability widens the attack surface. This guide explains how the attack works, shows real cases, and proposes a checklist of what to require before go-live.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-5823\" src=\"https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/activating-all-online-systems-cropped-shot-unrecognizable-businesswoman-sitting-alone-her-office-night-using-her-laptop-1-scaled.avif\" alt=\"Hands typing on a laptop in a dark room, with glowing data panels projected above the screen, representing AI agent security.\" width=\"2560\" height=\"1577\" srcset=\"https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/activating-all-online-systems-cropped-shot-unrecognizable-businesswoman-sitting-alone-her-office-night-using-her-laptop-1-scaled.avif 2560w, https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/activating-all-online-systems-cropped-shot-unrecognizable-businesswoman-sitting-alone-her-office-night-using-her-laptop-1-300x185.avif 300w, https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/activating-all-online-systems-cropped-shot-unrecognizable-businesswoman-sitting-alone-her-office-night-using-her-laptop-1-1024x631.avif 1024w, https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/activating-all-online-systems-cropped-shot-unrecognizable-businesswoman-sitting-alone-her-office-night-using-her-laptop-1-768x473.avif 768w, https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/activating-all-online-systems-cropped-shot-unrecognizable-businesswoman-sitting-alone-her-office-night-using-her-laptop-1-1536x946.avif 1536w, https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/activating-all-online-systems-cropped-shot-unrecognizable-businesswoman-sitting-alone-her-office-night-using-her-laptop-1-2048x1262.avif 2048w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 2560px) 100vw, 2560px\" \/><\/p>\n<h2 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"4\">What Is Prompt Injection?<\/h2>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Prompt injection is an attack in which an adversary places instructions in a text, email, web page, or document that a large language model (LLM) processes, leading it to do something the user or the company did not ask for. OWASP ranks it as <a href=\"https:\/\/genai.owasp.org\/llmrisk\/llm01-prompt-injection\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">risk number 1 (LLM01) in its 2025 list for LLM applications<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">There are two main forms:<\/p>\n<ul dir=\"ltr\">\n<li><strong>Direct injection:<\/strong> the user types instructions to get around the system\u2019s rules.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Indirect injection:<\/strong> the instruction is hidden in external content the agent reads while working (an incoming email, a web page, a PDF, a ticket, a document retrieved through RAG). The legitimate user may never notice.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">In a corporate setting, the second form is the more dangerous one: the attacker does not need access to your systems, only a way to place text where the agent will read it.<\/p>\n<h3 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"5\">How It Differs from Jailbreaking<\/h3>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">In general, a jailbreak tries to make the model break its own safety rules, for example to produce prohibited content. Prompt injection targets the application: it makes the system treat data as if it were a command. An agent can resist jailbreaks and still be manipulated by a document containing hidden instructions.<\/p>\n<h3 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"5\">Why It Is Not the Same as SQL Injection<\/h3>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Prompt injection is often compared to SQL injection, a well-known application security attack. In a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ncsc.gov.uk\/blog-post\/prompt-injection-is-not-sql-injection\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">blog post published on 8 December 2025, the UK\u2019s NCSC (National Cyber Security Centre) warns<\/a> that the comparison is dangerous: SQL injection has a structural fix (parameterized queries), whereas LLMs do not enforce a boundary between instructions and data inside a prompt. According to the NCSC, the problem will probably not be fully mitigated in the same way, and the realistic goal is to reduce likelihood and impact.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><a href=\"https:\/\/openai.com\/index\/prompt-injections\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">OpenAI takes a similar view<\/a> (article dated 7 November 2025): it describes the attack as a form of social engineering aimed at AI systems and acknowledges that robustness against it is an open problem.<\/p>\n<h2 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"4\">Why AI Agents Raise the Stakes<\/h2>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">A chatbot that gets an answer wrong produces, at worst, bad information. An agent that reads, decides, and acts inside internal systems can turn a malicious instruction into a real action: sending an email, changing a record, retrieving a contract, exporting data. The risk grows with what the agent can access and do, not with how sophisticated the model is.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">A practical way to assess this exposure is the \u201clethal trifecta,\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/simonwillison.net\/2025\/Jun\/16\/the-lethal-trifecta\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">described by Simon Willison on 16 June 2025<\/a>: an agent that combines access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and a channel for external communication can be induced to leak what it can see. All it takes is for malicious text to reach the agent through an ordinary input, such as an email.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">OWASP addresses the other half of the problem in item <a href=\"https:\/\/genai.owasp.org\/llmrisk\/llm062025-excessive-agency\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">LLM06, Excessive Agency<\/a>. The typical causes are three: excessive functionality (tools the agent does not need), excessive permissions (access beyond what is necessary), and excessive autonomy (high-impact actions without verification). If injection is the way in, excessive agency determines the size of the damage.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Documents retrieved through RAG are also untrusted input, since the agent treats whatever it fetches from the knowledge base as context.<\/p>\n<h3 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"4\">Real Cases: What Has Already Happened<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li dir=\"ltr\"><strong>EchoLeak, Microsoft 365 Copilot (2025): <\/strong>In June 2025, researchers at Aim Security disclosed a zero-click vulnerability in Microsoft 365 Copilot, tracked as <a href=\"https:\/\/thehackernews.com\/2025\/06\/zero-click-ai-vulnerability-exposes.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">CVE-2025-32711 (CVSS 9.3)<\/a>. According to the <a href=\"https:\/\/arxiv.org\/html\/2509.10540v1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">case study published on arXiv<\/a>, a single crafted email allowed confidential data to be extracted from Copilot\u2019s context with no action by the victim. Microsoft fixed the flaw without requiring customers to act. The lesson for the CTO: even an assistant from a major vendor, with several layers of protection, was vulnerable to an apparently ordinary input.<\/li>\n<li dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Red-teaming competition analyzed by NIST (2026):<\/strong>\u00a0CAISI, NIST\u2019s center for AI security, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nist.gov\/blogs\/caisi-research-blog\/insights-ai-agent-security-large-scale-red-teaming-competition\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">published on 23 March 2026<\/a> the findings of a public competition covering 13 frontier models in agent scenarios: more than 250,000 attack attempts from more than 400 participants. At least one successful attack was found against every model tested, and some attack families worked across several models. The lesson: choosing a \u201csafer\u201d model reduces exposure, but it does not replace architectural controls.<\/li>\n<li dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Brazilian courts (2026):<\/strong> on 20 May 2026, Brazil\u2019s Superior Court of Justice (STJ) <a href=\"https:\/\/www.stj.jus.br\/sites\/portalp\/Paginas\/Comunicacao\/Noticias\/2026\/20052026-Tentativas-de-uso-de-prompt-injection-no-STJ-serao-investigadas.aspx\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">announced it would investigate attempts to use prompt injection<\/a>. On 9 June, the National Council of Justice (CNJ) approved a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnj.jus.br\/inteligencia-artificial-cnj-aprova-orientacoes-para-a-manutencao-da-seguranca-juridica\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">technical note guiding courts<\/a> (page in Portuguese) on the risk of hidden commands inserted into case files. This is the indirect injection scenario: a third-party document, read by an AI, carries instructions invisible to a human. Any company whose agent reads contracts, r\u00e9sum\u00e9s, proposals, or customer tickets is in the same position.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"4\">Why a Better Prompt or a Filter Is Not Enough<\/h2>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The common reaction is to reinforce the system prompt (\u201cignore instructions that come from documents\u201d) or to install a keyword filter. Both help a little, but neither is enough. The NCSC recommends prioritizing deterministic safeguards outside the LLM that limit what the system can do, and advises against relying on blocklists, because there are endless ways to rephrase an attack. It also suggests being wary of products that promise to \u201cstop\u201d prompt injection.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">For the CTO, this changes the buying question. Instead of \u201cdoes the vendor block the attack?\u201d, it becomes \u201cwhat happens when the attack gets through?\u201d A well-designed agent assumes it will be fooled at some point and ensures that the damage is small, visible, and reversible.<\/p>\n<h2 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"4\">What the CTO Should Require Before Going to Production<\/h2>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The checklist below is an editorial proposal by NextAge, built from the recommendations of OWASP (LLM01 and LLM06), the NCSC, and OpenAI. It is not a standard or a certification: adapt it to the risk of each agent, with support from your security team.<\/p>\n<ol dir=\"ltr\">\n<li><strong>Inventory of untrusted inputs:<\/strong> map, for each agent, everything it reads from outside (email, web, PDFs, tickets, knowledge base). Acceptable evidence: a map per agent.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Lethal trifecta test:<\/strong> for each agent, check whether it combines private data, external content, and an outbound channel. Evidence: a completed matrix; no agent with all three factors without a compensating control.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Least privilege on tools:<\/strong>\u00a0Read-only when that is enough; no broad access \u201cfor convenience.\u201d Evidence: a permission list per tool.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Actions within the user\u2019s scope:<\/strong> operations run with the authorization of the user who triggered them, not with a generic, powerful agent account. Evidence: a documented authorization flow.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Human approval for high-impact actions:<\/strong> payments, external sends, deletions, and record changes go through confirmation. Evidence: a list of actions and the approval rule.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Deterministic controls outside the model:<\/strong> limits, validations, and allowlists enforced in code, not in the prompt. Evidence: a description of the control layer.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Controlled output:<\/strong> block exfiltration channels (arbitrary URLs, external emails, images loaded from outside). Evidence: network and egress rules.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Complete logging:<\/strong> keep inputs, outputs, tool calls, and failures for audit and investigation. Evidence: logs that are retained and searchable.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Adversarial testing before go-live and after every change:<\/strong> direct and indirect injection scenarios, including hidden text in documents. Evidence: a red-teaming report.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Rate limiting and an emergency stop:<\/strong> the ability to slow down or shut off the agent quickly. Evidence: a demonstration in a test environment.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Incident response plan for agents:<\/strong> who decides, who communicates, how actions are reversed. Evidence: a runbook with named owners.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Declared residual risk:<\/strong> no contractual promise of \u201ctotal blocking\u201d; the remaining risk must be described and formally accepted. Evidence: a clause and a risk register entry.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h2 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"4\">Questions to Ask the Vendor or the Internal Team<\/h2>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Take these questions to the acceptance meeting:<\/p>\n<ul dir=\"ltr\">\n<li>Which external content does the agent read, and which of it can be controlled by third parties?<\/li>\n<li>Does the agent combine private data, external content, and an outbound channel? Which control compensates for that?<\/li>\n<li>With what identity and what permissions does each tool run?<\/li>\n<li>Which actions require human approval, and who approves them?<\/li>\n<li>Which controls work outside the model, in code?<\/li>\n<li>How are inputs, outputs, and tool calls logged, and for how long?<\/li>\n<li>When was the last adversarial test, with which scenarios, and what failures were found?<\/li>\n<li>How is the agent shut down or restricted if it behaves suspiciously?<\/li>\n<li>What does the contract say about residual risk and liability?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">If the answer to any of them is \u201cthe model is already safe\u201d or \u201cthe filter takes care of it,\u201d treat it as a red flag.<\/p>\n<h2 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"4\">How Agent Architecture Reduces the Risk<\/h2>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Architecture does not eliminate prompt injection, but it sets the size of the damage. Agents designed with human oversight, autonomy limits, and an audit trail directly address the causes of excessive agency described by OWASP.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">That is the logic behind NextAge\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/en\/services\/ai-agents\/\">AI agents<\/a>: autonomous agents integrated with ERP, CRM, and internal systems, with a secure architecture that keeps humans in control and governance that includes autonomy limits and an audit trail. The project starts by mapping bottlenecks and ROI, and covers workstreams such as orchestration, knowledge base (RAG), monitoring, and governance. Security enters the design from the start, not as a final step. For the policy and roles layer, see the post on <a href=\"https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/blog\/en\/what-is-ai-governance\/\">AI governance<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"4\">Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\n<h3 dir=\"ltr\"><strong>What is prompt injection?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">It is an attack in which malicious instructions are inserted into texts, emails, web pages, or documents that a language model processes, making it perform actions the user did not ask for. In agents with access to systems, this can result in data leakage or unauthorized operations. OWASP ranks it as the number 1 risk in LLM applications.<\/p>\n<h3 dir=\"ltr\"><strong>What is the difference between direct and indirect prompt injection?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">In direct injection, the user types the malicious instructions into the interaction with the system. In indirect injection, the instructions are hidden in external content the agent reads, such as emails, web pages, and PDFs. Indirect injection is the bigger concern in a corporate environment, because the attacker does not need access to the system.<\/p>\n<h3 dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Are prompt injection and jailbreaking the same thing?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">No. A jailbreak tries to make the model break its own safety rules. Prompt injection exploits the fact that the system treats data as instructions, and it usually targets the application and its tools. An agent can resist jailbreaks and still be manipulated by a document with hidden commands.<\/p>\n<h3 dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Can the risk of prompt injection be eliminated?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">According to the NCSC and OpenAI, not definitively: both treat the problem as ongoing and recommend reducing likelihood and impact. In practice, that means limiting permissions, requiring human approval for critical actions, keeping logs, and testing the agent regularly.<\/p>\n<h3 dir=\"ltr\"><strong>What should a CTO require before putting an AI agent into production?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">An inventory of untrusted inputs, the lethal trifecta test, least privilege, human approval for high-impact actions, controls outside the model, complete logging, adversarial testing, and declared residual risk. The checklist in this guide details 12 requirements, with the expected evidence for each.<\/p>\n<h3 dir=\"ltr\"><strong>Which AI agents carry the most risk?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Those that combine access to private data, reading of external content, and the ability to act or communicate outward, such as agents that read emails and send messages, or that process third-party documents and write to internal systems. The greater the permission and autonomy, the greater the impact of a malicious instruction.<\/p>\n<h3 dir=\"ltr\"><strong>How can I test whether an agent is vulnerable to prompt injection?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">With adversarial testing (red teaming) before go-live and after every relevant change: direct and indirect injection scenarios, including hidden text in documents and emails, checking whether the agent performs actions outside its scope. The results should lead to fixes in the controls, not just prompt tweaks.<\/p>\n<h2 dir=\"ltr\" aria-level=\"4\">Conclusion: Three Next Steps<\/h2>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Prompt injection has no definitive solution, but it can be managed. If your company is evaluating or already running AI agents, three actions are worth taking this week:<\/p>\n<ol dir=\"ltr\">\n<li><strong>Inventory your agents<\/strong> and what each one reads, accesses, and can execute.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Apply the lethal trifecta test<\/strong> to each one and reduce permissions wherever the three factors meet.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Bring the checklist<\/strong> to the acceptance meeting for your next agent, with the expected evidence.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Want to evaluate an AI agent with security and human oversight built into the design? <a href=\"https:\/\/nextage.com.br\/en\/services\/ai-agents\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Talk to NextAge<\/a>; the first conversation is free and without commitment.<\/p>\n<p><script type=\"application\/ld+json\">\n{\n  \"@context\": \"https:\/\/schema.org\",\n  \"@type\": \"FAQPage\",\n  \"mainEntity\": [\n    {\n      \"@type\": \"Question\",\n      \"name\": \"What is prompt injection?\",\n      \"acceptedAnswer\": {\n        \"@type\": \"Answer\",\n        \"text\": \"It is an attack in which malicious instructions are inserted into texts, emails, web pages, or documents that a language model processes, making it perform actions the user did not ask for. 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That is why a CTO\u2019s requirement before putting an agent into production should not be \u201cblock the attack,\u201d but rather \u201climit<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":5820,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[269],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5822","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-technology"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.1 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Prompt Injection and AI Agent Security: A Checklist - NextAge Blog<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Learn how prompt injection works, why it puts AI agents at risk, and what CTOs should require before production. 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